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CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the WTO standard, five levels of economic arrangement can be 
distinguished.  The loosest type of economic arrangement is the Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA), which allows preferential benefits to certain products or members.  Free Trade 
Area (FTA) is the second benign economic arrangement.  FTA allows trade in the region 
to flow freely without any tax or customs at the borders, therefore discriminating against 
outside of the bloc.  Member countries of FTA do not necessarily have to adopt the same 
trade policy towards non-member countries.  North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) eliminated all kinds of trade barriers – or even when there is import tax, for 
example, they impose same rate – within the region while it maintains individual trade 
practices and policies towards non-member countries.  Meanwhile, Customs Union 
(CU) not only adopts free trade within the region but also has to set a same trade policy 
towards non-member countries.  If country A of FTA is imposing 70% import tax on the 
alcoholic beverage from non-member country D, then member country B and C will 
impose the same tax towards the same product from D.  In this sense, CU is more 
integrated than FTA.  Common Market (CM), a deeper integration of economies, allows 
free movement not only of final goods and services but also the movement of 
intermediaries, such as capital and labor.  Economic Union (EU) is the ultimate stage of 
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economic integration.  EU not only has to be a common market but also has to adopt 
same fiscal and monetary policy, technically forming single economy.  North American 
region has established Free Trade Area (NAFTA); European Union is, although yet to 
have single fiscal and monetary policy, is gearing towards Economic Union.  For this 
reason, Europe is yet European Economic Community (EEC) and not economic union by 
WTO standard.  However, the region is perceived as the most integrated economy in the 
world, and prefers to be called itself (European Economic) Union.  Although economic 
integration does not necessarily have to correspond with the order of the WTO integration 
level, it is fairly safe to say that monetary coordination is the most complex one requiring 
high level of political coordination to come later phase of economic integration.  Given 
this, the recent trend of Asian economic cooperation is puzzling.   
Despite the high level of intra-regional economic interdependency that is no less 
than the level of European Union, Asia marks the lowest degree of regionalization.  
Regionalization is defined here as an economic integration through legalized mechanism 
of cooperation, which allows to enforce and to monitor the implementation of policies 
that are agreed among nations.   
Countries in the region have been reluctant to engage in any set of official or 
legal bindings at a regional level due to their political rivalries and hostilities through out 
the history.  APEC, for example, is the most advanced region-wide gathering for 
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economic cooperation.  It is, however, yet to be called regional "institution" because it 
does not have legal bindings or any enforcement mechanism to implement and monitor 
agreed policies.  Asia is still an "open"1 region.  Policies are consensus-based and its 
implementation is unilateral and voluntary, only depending on diplomatic pressures from 
other countries.  Consequently, facing any policy that contradicts with domestic interest, 
a country cannot always abide by and no other countries have a legitimacy to put 
retaliation on it since other member countries cannot legitimately retaliate.  While other 
region has established certain level of economic integration in one-way or another (i.e. 
NAFTA, EU, etc.), Asian countries have been explicit on their disinclination of formal 
bindings in any form.  The present study is an attempt to understand the reasons behind 
in this peculiar development in Asia.2 
Chapter II reviews the history of Asian monetary cooperation.  It presents three 
phase of Asian Monetary Cooperation.  First phase shows primitive efforts of Asian 
economic cooperation.  Although there are increasing effort for regional economic 
cooperation up until 1996, Asia has faced difficulties to institutionalize any set of agreed 
policies and cooperative mechanisms.  Second phase revolves around the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997.  The period coincides with Asian Financial Crisis.  Region-
                                                 
1 "Open Regionalism" has been adopted as a fundamental principle of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC).   Although the origin of the term has not been verified, it is recognized as official 
term to indicate non-discriminative membership and unilateral implementation of agreed policies (see Fred 
Bergsten, Wither APEC, IIE,?).  Here "open regionalism" is used in a broader sense, simply indicating the 
absence of regional economic bloc or any set of formal integration of economic activities. 
2 Refer to Helleiner, Eric.  1994.  States and the Reemergence of Global Finance:  From Bretton Woods 
to the 1990s.  Ithaca:  Cornell University Press. 
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wide scope of economic crisis is believed to give certain legitimacy to monitor and 
enforce the economies each other in the region.  A consensus was formed around the 
issue of more adequate and prompt crisis management and of more accurate mechanism 
to predict and prevent further crisis.  A proposal for Asian Monetary Fund, which is 
supposed to be tailored in Asian way, was the key issue in this period.  Despite the 
ambition and initial welcoming from the region, it soon encountered with strong 
opposition from the international arena, mostly from the U.S. and the IMF and followed 
by the hesitance of regional players.  The third phase started as the AMF proposal fades 
outs.  Facing strong opposition and difficulties to materialize AMF, the region has been 
seeking for alternative mechanism to meet their need for crisis management and 
prevention.   
Chapter III examines studies and policy proposals on this matter.  There are 
three groups of studies and findings.  First group of studies are regional monetary 
arrangements.  Main focus is the feasibility of the creation of the AMF and other 
monetary arrangement as the AMF proposal was nullified.  Second group evaluates the 
region if it meets the criteria of Optimum Currency Area.  Intra-regional 
interdependency of the regional economies proves that the region will greatly benefit by 
forming a currency bloc or intensive monetary coordination although several adverse 
factors remain.  This group also includes the role of yen and dollar in the regional 
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economy as de facto or potential regional currency bloc.   
Third group focuses on the role of Japan and internationalization of yen currency.  
Japanese government has long been promoted internationalization of yen in order to 
recap its long-standing economic recession.  It is also pointed out that the regional dollar 
pegged exchange rate system aggravated the impact of the crisis by .  
Chapter IV scrutinizes the political interest of players within and outside of the 
region to draw a conclusion that diverse interest among countries and actors within and 
outside of the region has nullified the AMF proposal.  Intra-regional countries includes 
ASEAN plus Three (Republic of Korea, China and Japan).  For the extra-regional 
countries and actors, the author put greater importance on the U.S. and the IMF whereas 
giving brief comments for the part of EU, New Zealand and Australia. 
Chapter V is conclusion that implication of the study is presented.  Although 
region-wide monetary cooperation revolves around the Asian crisis of 1997, initial 
enthusiasm was simply temporary due to diverse interest of the intra- and extra-regional 
factors based on their political rivalries and hostilities.  Asian Monetary Cooperation 
will surely bring great benefit to the region, yet the process should be taken in a gradual 
phase to resolve these political barriers
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CHAPTER II.  HISTORY OF ASIAN MONETARY COOPERATION 
 
Chapter II explores the path of Asian Monetary Cooperation in a big scheme of 
regional economic cooperation.  Asian Monetary Cooperation has taken largely three 
phases.  The first phase is cooperative efforts for monetary issues in general among 
central banks and administration, started from 1950s until 1996.  The second phase 
focuses on the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF, hereafter) proposal that surged during the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and drawback of the proposal due to the lack of constant 
and sufficient support from the region and strong opposition from international 
community.  The third phase presents discussion on alternative mechanism for crisis 
management and prevention as the AMF proposal was virtually jettisoned.  Later this 
period, the scope of discussions is expanded to a broader scheme of financial/monetary 
cooperation and a search for a more accountable mechanism among the countries to 
stabilize regional economy. 
 
2.1 Asian Monetary Cooperation (AMC) before Financial Crisis of 1997 
 
In the 1950s, Southeast Asia, New Zealand and Australia had introduced central 
bankers' training program, called SEANZA.  In 1966, SEACEN (Southeast Asian 
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Central Banks) was established to promote information exchange among central banks in 
the region.  These two remained a primitive network until 1982 when SEACEN 
Research and Training Center3 was established to help close networking among central 
banks of eight members; Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Malaysia, Central Bank of 
Myanmar, Nepal Rastra Bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, and Bank of Thailand.  It has grown to eleven 
members with the inclusion of The Bank of Korea in 1990, The Central Bank of China, 
Taipei, in 1992, and The Bank of Mongolia in 1999.  The center analyses financial, 
monetary, banking and economic developments in its constituent member countries and 
the region as a whole.  It initiates and facilitates co-operation in research and training 
relating to the policy and operational aspects of central banking. 
The purpose of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional 
organization established on Aug. 8, 1967, was to accelerate economic growth, social 
progress, and cultural development and to promote peace and security in the Southeast 
Asia region in pursuit of regional security cooperation and economic development.  
Member comprised of the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand.  This ASEAN cooperation is simply too broad to be seen as a 
real attempt to achieve substantial economic cooperation from the beginning.  It was 
                                                 
3 Available at http://www.seacen.org  
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initially designed to enhance and ensure regional security.  Any economic cooperation 
was simply superficial.   
Ten years passed since its establishment, the five original ASEAN countries 
entailed two initiations for economic cooperation.  On one hand, ASEAN started their 
first trade policy negotiation, and on the other hand, in pursuit of their common objective 
to promote monetary cooperation, it has established an ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
(August 1977) for a period of one year.  Since then, the ASEAN Swap Arrangement has 
been renewed several times, in accordance with Article X avowed in Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) of ASEAN Swap Arrangement.  Although it is the very first 
official initiation for regional economic/monetary cooperation, one should not interpret it 
as an onset of regional economic integration.  Although the first trade policy negotiation 
started in 1997, and the policy was implemented in the late 1980s, taking almost 10 years 
to come about.4  The Swap Arrangement does not impose any constrain, therefore 
require no political commitment in an ordinary time.   
These government initiatives from the early 1950s were primitive and did not 
carry considerable development for regional economic cooperation.  The efforts for 
monetary cooperation now should be dealt in a broader framework as the region came to 
closer economic cooperation through transregional groups and councils.   
                                                 
4 p. 27, Development Commity as a Way of Economic Cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan, (Han-
Chung-Il Kyungjae Hyup Ryuk Eul We Han Gae Bal Gong Dong Chae Yeun Goo) , KDI 
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In fact, it is private business that has driven closer interactions among the 
countries in the region.  US Commerce Undersecretary Jeffrey Garten says, " While the 
European Union was the product of great triumphs of diplomacy and their creation of 
new legislative mechanisms, Asian integration has driven by business."  Indeed, private 
businesses were the first to organize into transregional groups.  The Pacific Basin 
Economic Council (PBEC),5 founded in 1968, is a private organization of businessmen 
in the region.6  The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)7, established in 
1980 in Canberra, Australia follows.  PECC is characterized by the tripartite 
participation of government officials, businessmen, and academics. 
The major step forward on intergovernmental economic cooperation in Asia-
Pacific region is Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).8  APEC was launched in 
1989, members comprise of eighteen countries in the Asia-Pacific focusing on 
consultation about matters of regional economic cooperation. From its inception, APEC 
was not to be an economic bloc or legally bound free trade area like the European 
Community or NAFTA.  APEC has encouraged nations to make concessions voluntarily, 
based on the theory that economic liberalization is a benefit unto itself.9  The 1993 
APEC meeting marked a new era in the evolution of APEC.  President Clinton invited 
                                                 
5 Refer to http://www.pbec.org  
6 p.22, Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion; Japan's Role in APEC, Institute for International Economics, 
1995 
7 Refer to http://www.pecc.org  
8 Refer to http://www.apec.org.sg  
9 p.3, Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion; Japan's Role in APEC, IIE, 1995 
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all 17 APEC leaders to Seattle for the first time Asia Pacific Summit.  The leader's 
meeting was a huge success, surmounting many of the institutional barriers that had 
handicapped earlier meeting.10 
In February 1991, Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks 
(EMEAP) 11  was launched in order to strengthen cooperative relationship among 
members of APEC.  It comprises the central banks of eleven economies; Reserve Bank 
of Australia, People's Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, 
Bank of Japan, The Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Bank of 
Thailand.  In the first period from 1991 to 1996, EMEAP held, on an informal and 
confidential basis, Deputy-level meetings twice a year to discuss information and ideas 
concerning economic and financial developments in the region.  In 1996, Governors' 
Meeting and working / study groups were formed and established two working groups 
(the Financial Market Development WG and Central Banking Operations WG) and one 
study group (the Banking Supervision SG) to research on the primary functions of central 
banks.  This is a big step forward although it is not a formal monetary cooperation 
forum.  Currently, EMEAP's activities broadly encompass three levels; 1. Annual 
meetings of EMEAP governors; 2. semi-annual ones involving the deputy governor; 3. 
                                                 
10 p.79, Yoishi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion; Japan's role in APEC 
11 Refer to http://www.emeap.org:8084  
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Three working groups on Banking Supervision, Financial Markets and Payments and 
Settlement Systems.  It was only after the governors initiated their regular meetings since 
1996 that the EMEAP became fairly active, with the establishment of the various 
Working Groups.  It became active during Tequila crisis by reaching repurchase 
agreements (repo) in 1995 and 96; the creditor regional economies also attempted to help 
defend Thai baht for some period before Bank of Thailand succumbed to the speculative 
pressures in the mid 1997.  EMEAP seems fairly dormant since then.12 
A substantial economic cooperation in general has been taken since the late 
1970s and interaction and networking between central bankers was initiated from 1990s.  
Nonetheless, proceedings on monetary coordination remain rudimentary until the 
outbreak of Asian Financial crisis. 
 
2.2 Asian Financial Crisis and the Emergence of the AMF Proposal 
 
In 1997 September, a proposal for Asian Monetary Fund was first addressed by 
Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibura at the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM).  The countries, in the midst of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
enthusiastically welcomed the proposal.  Experiencing catastrophic region-wide crisis, 
                                                 
12 Chang Li Lin and Ramkishen Rajan, The Economics and Politics of Monetary Regionalism in Asia, 
March 2001, Adelaide Univ., Australia, Center for International Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 
0107 
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Asian countries became skeptical on the efficiency of IMF on crisis management and 
surveillance.  Besides, no guarantee assured to prevent further crisis.  Therefore, the 
AMF proposal is basically questioning the role of IMF.  Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, addressed that Asian countries, after the 1997 currency 
crisis, felt that support and guidance particularly from current multilateral institutions, 
have been less forthcoming than they would have liked.  Furthermore, they felt that the 
special circumstances and interests of economies in the region have not been adequately 
taken into account.  Nor do their voices count for enough.13  
The proposal was immediately withdrawn in the face of strong American 
opposition.  However, regional leaders have incorporated the idea into several policy 
proposals later that year (November, 1997).  South Korean Prime Minister Kim, Jong-
Pil publicly asked Tokyo to revive its plan for AMF.  In December, Japanese Finance 
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa again suggested complementing IMF loans through “some 
kind of regional currency support mechanism… funded by countries in the region that are 
strongly dependent upon each other in the fields of trade and investment and that are 
conducting continuous dialogue with each other on their policy directions.” 14  
Unprecedented speed and scope of the crisis successfully called attention of each country 
in Asia for closer cooperation on the monetary issues.   
                                                 
13 Joseph Yam,"Asian Monetary Fund," Jacobson Lectures, September 21, 1997 
14 "Currency Swap Plan Moves Closer," May 10, 2001, Biz Asia, find article at 
http://www.bizasia.com/gen/articles/stand_art.htm?ac=ENKZ5-8 
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The AMF is actually an enlargement of existing ASEAN currency swap 
agreements created in 1977.  The rationale is that Asian nations attain available pool of 
funds to draw to manage urgent liquidity problems through efficient utilization of the 
foreign-exchange reserves of each other to defend their currencies in time of crisis.  The 
ASEAN pool is judged to be too small (US $200 million), thus the member nation roster 
must be expanded to include Japan, China and South Korea.  Then the AMF would 
become a lender of last resort in the absence of any such sources elsewhere.15  Since 
1997, ASEAN has invited Korea, China and Japan to form a meeting so called 
ASEAN+3, the only summit level forum in East Asia so far.  It is to discuss on regional 
and international issues yet its main focus is regional economic cooperation and reform 
of financial system, which became a priority after the crisis.  Concerns, especially from 
the U.S., were raised about the possibility of bypassing the IMF's conditionalities, thus 
the discipline thereof, and receive easy money from the AMF; proponents, of course, 
claim that AMF would be able to complement the IMF, as ADB complements IBRD. 
Attention has been called into the region, first by the crisis and second by the 
proposal of the AMF; the proposal was followed by several discussions and alternative 
proposals later on.  Among many debates on the realization of the AMF, Fred Bergsten, 
                                                 
15 Fear of Japanese Dominance in AMF, Biz Asia, May 06 2000, 
http://www.bizasia.com/gen/articles/stand_art.htm?ac=ZD6Q9-S 
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Director of Institute for International Economics, proposed the Asia-Pacific Monetary 
Fund (APMF).16  Membership extended to Pacific countries, especially the U.S., may 
better serve the region to carry out necessary functions while not conflicting but 
complementing the IMF.  However, there seemed to be no sign of support or welcome 
for this proposal other than the U.S.  
 
2.3 Asian Monetary Cooperation After 
 
Shortly after the demise of the idea of the AMF, Asian countries plus non-Asian 
countries, including the U.S., agreed to start a new forum called Manila Framework.  In 
November 1997, APEC summit meeting, ASEAN invited central bankers and financial 
ministers of fourteen economies in the region, IMF, World Bank, and ADB to Manila to 
discuss how to bring financial stability in the region.  Manila Framework for Enhanced 
Asian Regional Cooperation to Promote Financial Stability (Manila Framework 
hereafter) is a compromise of the AMF proposal.  Instead of processing the AMF 
creation, countries – Asian countries and non-Asian countries including the U.S. – 
adopted the New Arrangement to Borrow and the establishment of regional monitoring 
system.  The bilateral financing packages for the crisis-hit economies were arranged in 
                                                 
16 Fred Bergsten is believed to be U.S. supporter. Fred Bergsten, Reviving " Asian Monetary Fund," The 
International Economics, Institute for International Economics, November/December 1998, 
http://www.iie.com/policybriefs/NEWS98-8.HTM  
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the framework as a second line of defense.  Nevertheless, the framework is highly 
limited as it has "no formal status, secretariat or other institutional 
foundation...(S)upplementary funding has not been implemented on a permanent and 
assured basis" (Wang, 2000, p.208).17   As such, at a practical level, the Manila 
Framework appears to be a high level regional forum which allows a candid sharing of 
views and opinions in regional and financial matters and concerns.18 
In July 1998, Japanese Minister of Finance Miyazawa proposed for Currency 
Defense Fund to prevent speculative attack (Miyazawa Plan) which function is similar to 
that the AMF was supposed to have.  Later that year at G7 meeting, countries reached 
an agreement to mobilize funds for a future crisis with the amount of 30.6 billion (New 
Miyazawa Plan) and established working group to ensue the proposal thereafter.  The 
Miyazawa Plan is a newly devised support program of multilateral parties for the region.  
The plan is specifically designed for crisis-afflicted Asian countries to reinvigorate the 
economy in the medium-term.  Until 1998, discussion and researches on the feasibility 
or benefits of AMF had been occasionally reported. 
The AMF virtually faded away as Japanese Ministry of Finance officially closed 
the discussion in 1999 partly due to lack of support in the region.  This decreasing 
                                                 
17 pp.205-17, Wang, Y. "The Asian Financial Crisis and its Aftermath: Do We Need A Regional Financial 
Arrangement?" ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 17, 2000 
18 Chang Li Lin and Ramkishen Rajan, The Economics and Politics of Monetary Regionalism in Asia, 
March 2001, Adelaide Univ., Australia, Center for International Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 
0107 
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enthusiasm on AMF proposal in the region is because the U.S. who still is a major partner 
in regional economy is against the proposal.  It is also true that Asian countries would 
not want to conflict with the IMF for they are beneficiary of IMF and still under its 
program.  Meanwhile, Walden Bello reported on the Asian Development Bank's 
proposal to establish a system of currency swap arrangements to protect regional 
currencies against financial crises.  The ASEAN+3 group first made a formal Joint 
Statement on East Asian Cooperation at the ASEAN+3 summit held in November 1999 
in Manila.  This subsequently led to the Chiangmai Initiative, which was announced 
after the ASEAN+3 finance ministers meeting held in May 2000 in Chiangmai, Thailand.  
Chiangmai Initiative is aimed at providing countries under pressure with short-term hard 
currency liquidity to bolster reserves through bilateral swaps.19  The Initiative aims to 
establish a regional financing arrangement to supplement existing international facilities.  
Sharing a view that they should strengthen the financial cooperative framework in the 
region, Ministers reached agreement on the so-called Chiangmai Initiatives, which is 
designed to expand the existing ASEAN Swap Arrangement and create a network of 
bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN countries, China, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea.  The purpose of the bilateral swap arrangements is to 
                                                 
19 From Chang and Rajan (2001); Wheatley, A. "Closer Asian Monetary Ties may Become Reality," 
Bangkok Post, Thailand, August 10 2000, Also See " The Chiang Mai Initiative," A Discussion Paper for the 
Special ASEAN Finance Deputies Meeting (AFDM) +3 (May 6, 2000).  
Available at: http://www.mfa.go.th/dea/chiangmai%20initiative.htm  
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provide short-term financial assistance in the form of swaps to countries in need of 
balance of payment or short-term liquidity support.  The Chiangmai Initiatives may be 
seen as watered-down versions of the 1997 Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF), with a US$ 100 billion funding.  In contrast, the currency swap 
arrangement would require US$ 20-40 billion dollar.20  Therefore, Chiangmai Initiatives 
satisfies the needs of Asian countries to attain regional economic arrangement that would 
fully project the needs and voices of the economies in the region for financial cooperation, 
and lessen the conflict and opposition from extra-regional actors, like the IMF or the U.S. 
 
2.4 Momentum for Asian Monetary Cooperation 
 
Asian monetary cooperation has been subtle until 1996.  It is only after the 
outbreak of region-wide crisis in 1997 that Asian countries became on the monetary 
matters in the scope of regional economic cooperation.  More accurately, the attention of 
Asian countries was not in broad scale monetary cooperation.  It rather started from the 
effort to pool available resources to respond more promptly and effectively to the 
liquidity crisis.  However, it is widely understood by Asian countries that economy of 
one country substantial influence other economies in the region from the experience of 
                                                 
20 Kristen Nordhaug, Asian Monetary Fund revival?,find at 
http://www.focusweb.org/focus/pd/apec/fot/fot51.htm#amf Kristen Nordhaug is an assistant professor at 
International Development Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark.  
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the 1997 crisis.  Consequently, the administrations seek to stabilize their economies in a 
scheme of regional economic stability and to effectively assist each other in the time of 
crisis. 
 
It is quite understandable that the region is barely institutionalized given the 
context that Asian countries have been political rivalries through out the history and is 
therefore the least institutionalized.  The 1997 crisis eventually gave Asian countries a 
legitimacy to concern and intervene other economies in the region for one’s own 
macroeconomic stability.  The proceedings on Asian monetary cooperation became 
since 1997 with AMF proposal as it questions on the role of IMF.  However, it faces 
strong opposition from the U.S. and multilateral financial institutions especially the IMF.  
Ever since the AMF was proposed, regional leaders have motivated to bring substantial 
monetary cooperation in the region through Manila Framework and Miyazawa Plan.  
The most current and important event on regional monetary cooperation was Chiangmai 
Initiative in May 2000.  The initiative involves an expanded ASEAN Swap arrangement 
that would include all ASEAN countries, and a network of bilateral swap and repurchase 
agreement facilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. 
Although the AMF discussion was officially closed in 1999, discussions both 
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through Track I and Track II have been enthusiastically searching for alternatives.21  A 
number of regional consortia and seminars have been producing working papers and 
policy proposals on this matter, which are explained in the next chapter. 
                                                 
21 Track I refers to Government level official networking; Track II on the other hand, refers to the 
discussions and information exchange among academics and non-official personnel. 
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CHAPTER III.  ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR ASIAN 
MONETARY COOPERATION  
 
Cooperative efforts on monetary issues in Asia were gradually advanced first by 
efforts from the private business actors among central banks and administrations until the 
outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  Many studies and proposals on the 
regional coordination for monetary issues were propelled by the crisis.  Those studies 
can be broadly categorized into three groups.   
First group concentrates on regional monetary arrangement.  The AMF 
proposal was to consolidate segregated efforts for management and prevention of further 
crisis to bring monetary stability.   Its primary function would be to facilitate pooling 
resources in case of liquidity crisis if the IMF is not able to respond promptly and 
adequately.  As the proposal came to halt, the region sought for a substitute of the AMF.  
Administrations of the regional economies reached Currency Swap Agreements that 
would require a rather moderate form of legitimacy and institutional barriers than the 
AMF and is still able to fulfill the necessary functions.  Besides provision of liquidity, 
studies also emphasize the importance of more reliable and accurate surveillance systems.   
Second group of studies examine the possibility of currency bloc formation in 
Asia.  Studies, based on the theoretical framework, mainly assess how well Asian 
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countries meet criteria of Optimum Currency Area (OCA, hereafter).  One group of 
studies reviews theoretical evaluation OCA, the other group examines yen and dollar 
whether one of the two formed a de facto currency bloc. 
Third group of studies focuses on the internationalization of yen.  It also 
examines if any de facto currency bloc is formed in the region by tracking how much 
values were imposed on certain currency in each country's currency basket policy.  The 
primary purpose of these studies aimed to search for a better coordination policy to bring 
regional economic stability.   Related studies examine current exchange rate systems in 
the region.  It has often pointed out that Asian exchange rate systems pegged to dollar 
and not putting enough weight to yen aggravated the impact of the crisis.  It evaluates 
the changes in dollar and yen standing in the regional economic transactions and 
exchange rate coordination   
 
3.1 Regional Monetary Arrangement 
 
3.1.1 Asian Monetary Fund 
As it was elucidated in chapter I, the proposal of AMF surged in the midst of 
financial crisis in Asia.  Given the context, it is basically questioning the performance 
and role of IMF.  During the Asian crisis, countries in the region came to believe IMF 
might not be the best solution at least for Asian type of crisis.  The IMF has exhibited 
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problems as international lender of last resort, also as crisis manager as it implements 
stabilization programs. 
 
3.1.1.a.  Problems that IMF Exhibited in Managing the Asian Crisis 
First of all, IMF failed to inject sufficient and immediate liquidity.  Triggered 
by Thai baht collapse, the Asian crisis spread to the region contagiously.  Currencies 
came under attack and massive capital outflows brought bank insolvency problem and 
further drains in foreign reserves.  Therefore, the most urgent action at this phase would 
be the provision of sufficient and immediate liquidity to minimize disruptive but 
temporary distortion of the balance of payment and to curb market hysteria. 
IMF was in fact unable to fulfill this need during the Asian case.  IMF bailout 
fund, by nature, did not arrive as quickly and massively as it should have, to prevent 
credit crunches and recessions.  IMF bailout fund is rather inefficient to inject massive 
fund to curb the contagion effect of the crisis by its nature.22  First, it is phased.  In 
order to make sure that IMF restructuring plan is being implemented, funds are provided 
in phases.  Second, it is conditional.  Funds are injected with conditionality that often 
requires structural change in the economy that usually bears a significant political cost.  
It is, therefore, takes some time to gain domestic legitimacy of these measurements in 
                                                 
22 Radelet and Sachs (1998) argued that IMF bailout lending is ineffective because it is restrictive, 
conditional, and phased. 
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order to be implemented.  Third, countries postpone receiving IMF bailout package until 
the very last moment.  Governments are rather hesitant to go to the IMF until they face 
deadlock since IMF funds usually perceived as a shameful by plummeting credit level of 
national economy.  For Asian Tigers, it would be more so for those who have made 
Asian Miracles with their own approach and pride.  
There is also a question of the ability to restore market confidence through IMF 
stabilization programs to halt aggravation of crisis.  If to support immediate liquidity is 
emergency treatment, it is also important to restore market confidence in order to curb 
further capital leakage and eventually to bring capital inducement back.  One role of the 
lender of last resort is to forestall panic simply by its presence (Sachs 1999).  There is a 
view that IMF programs, once implemented, would invite a positive private market 
response and would make a full disbursement of the official financial support 
unnecessary. 
The Asian crisis, however, revealed that the IMF-supported programs did not 
necessarily restore private actor's confidence.  The announcement of the IMF-led rescue 
package did not prevent the economy of crisis-affected countries from deteriorating.  
Instead, formal and informal agreements by foreign banks to keep their lines of in place 
were crucial elements for a quick restoration of market confidence.23  For example, the 
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Korean Crisis ended not on December 4, 1997, when the IMF package of US $ 57 billion 
was formulated, but on December 29, when the Federal Reserve Board engineered a 
rollover of short-term debts (Sachs, 1999).24 
Partly the reason lies on the principle of the IMF stabilization program.  IMF 
program has been based on the premise that institutional structures were flawed and 
therefore institutional reform is required.  When IMF implemented restructuring plans 
and close down financial firms, it rather brought panic run of banking system than 
bringing market confidence.  Besides, it is increasing opinion that IMF premises maybe 
wrong in case of Asian crisis.  Rapid recovery of Asian economies proves that the 
causes of the crisis in Asia are not necessarily have to be structural problems such as 
macroeconomic distortion or crony capitalism; generally, economic crisis rooted on the 
structural problems cannot be recovered in such short term. 
Second, IMF did not account for different domestic situations and exhibited 
biased response.  The IMF prescriptions were not tailored to the needs of crisis-hit 
economies.  The cause of crisis perceived to be macroeconomic problems but it varies 
from country to country.25  In addition, IMF remedies are macroeconomic restructuring 
whereas it is increasing belief that the cause of the Asian crisis was not in 
macroeconomic problems but problems embedded in international financial architecture 
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itself as Asia exhibit fast economic recovery.   Besides, the consequences of crisis hit 
countries were vary from one to another.  Therefore, IMF prescription should have been 
case and country specific.  However, IMF measurement were not corresponding to these 
differences.   
IMF also did not respond equally to the crisis-hit countries.  Some countries 
like Thailand did not even get enough attention from the IMF.  Regional leaders argue 
that the Asian crisis would not have been so disastrous if IMF had responded actively to 
Thailand crisis.   
A rescue fund was set up financed by the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, and countries of the region.  The unwillingness of the United States to provide 
financial support to a regional rescue fund during this stage of the crisis – unlike the 
financial crisis in Mexico in 1994/95 – weakened its standing in the region.  It was 
claimed by regional leaders that the unwillingness of the United States to provide funds 
to Thailand led to an escalation of the crisis.26 
Third, existing surveillance system has proven to be ineffective and in need of a 
revision.  Any set of policies for more effective management and prevention should 
respond to the kind of crises one anticipates encountering in the future.  Asian crisis, in 
this sense, pose a question to the current mechanism.  Macroeconomic indicators have 
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often used to evaluate the economy and forecast crisis.  Most of the crisis hit countries, 
save Thailand, did not show macroeconomic red signals before the crisis.  It turned out 
that financial weakness of the banks and large corporations played an important role in 
precipitating the crisis.  Besides, liberalization of rapidly emerging markets enables an 
economy to be fueled by private capitals necessary for economic development, it 
becomes more vulnerable as the private capital holding far exceeds that of the 
government.   
Fourth, the IMF program has been bailed out private capital from sharing the 
cost and burden of the crisis.  The source of liquidity problem was massive reversals in 
capital flows.  Liberalization of financial markets were being liberalized while 
government provide guarantee to protect domestic financial institutions.  This becomes 
problematic when most of them are short-term based capital and financial systems are not 
sound enough to survive out of external shocks.  Meanwhile, capital outflow was much 
greater than domestic foreign reserves to defend or to slow down the reversal effect.  In 
other words, private sector's holding of capital was far greater than government has at its 
disposal. 
It is important to mitigate speculative activities such as hedge fund or highly 
leveraged financial institutions.27  When crisis occurs, the cost of crisis has been 
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imposed on the affected countries and its citizens.  Investors will always be saved and 
get reimbursed.  Government is no longer able to control cross-country capital 
movements.  If they want to liberalize financial market, they need to abandon control 
over capital movement.  Therefore, countries would expect international monetary 
regime to introduce a mechanism that would restrain these speculative activities by 
imposing the cost of crisis on their part also.  However, there is no mechanism to 
restrain these activities so far.  The IMF remedies were no different.  It did not have 
any mechanism to contain speculative activities and to impose certain cost on their part.  
Blames were targeting government policy instigating structural problems. 
Despite the defeat of the AMF proposal there were some new low-key efforts at 
regional integration during autumn 1998.  On 3 October 1998 Japan's authorities 
launched a plan drawn up by Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa for a US$30 billion aid 
initiative at a G7 meeting of central bankers and finance ministers in Washington.  
Tokyo attempted to minimize resistance from Washington and the IMF by carefully 
couching the idea in the contest of broader aid effort involving the G-7 industrialized 
countries, as well as the IMF and the World Bank.  The timing of the presentation of the 
initiative may also have been favorable, since the IMF was running out of funds and the 
U.S. Congress had still not approved the U.S.$ 14.5 billion replenish of the IMF funds.  
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The Japanese initiative was even supported by the IMF this time.  The U.S. side was 
less positive, but this time did not attempt to shoot down the proposal.28  Given this, 
Asian countries were convinced that IMF might not be sufficient or efficient to manage 
Asian-type crisis.  Besides, there is no guarantee is in case of a second crisis. 
 
3.1.1.b.  Economic Rational for the Asian Monetary Fund 
The funs available to the AMF would be $100 billion dollar as initially proposed 
by Japan at the IMF annual meeting of 1999 September.  Japan would supply $50 billion 
and the remaining half, by Korea, China.  The main question is whether Asian countries 
possess enough foreign reserves since the fun would be in U.S. dollar.  Compared to 
major industrialized countries, East Asia has fairly considerable accumulation of foreign 
reserves.  Nevertheless, it should not be pre-ascertained considering the weaknesses of 
financial systems and external debt of countries in the region, for the level of foreign 
reserve depends on the stability of financial system and the ability to repay foreign debt 
and accordingly. (Table 1. Foreign Reserves in Asia, Appendix B, p.72) 
For several reasons, AMF seems plausible.  First, bailout packages are already 
arranged on a regional basis.  ASEAN has adopted an agreement to borrow from the 
1960s.  Indeed, most bailout packages in Asia of late crisis period have been regional, 
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 29 
since the IMF does not possess sufficient resources to put together rescues unilaterally.29 
Nonetheless, the difficulty rises in mobilization of initial capital.  In 1997, 
Japan organized a group of Asian countries that volunteered to head up and offered $100 
billion as initial capital.  This is a small fraction of the almost US$ 1 trillion in 
international reserves that Asian countries currently hold. 30   Besides, Japanese 
government is no longer in position to provide large amounts of financial assistance to 
foreign countries.  Almost a decade of futile economic stimulus packages has pushed 
Japan's gross debt to US$ 4.6 trillion in 1999 and expected to grow.31 
 
3.1.2 Other Monetary Mechanisms  
As the AMF proposal was denied, leaders of the region push two other 
mechanisms; Currency Swap Agreement for liquidity fund and ASEAN Surveillance 
Process to monitor and prevent further crisis.  These mechanisms require less 
institutional or political coordination than AMF. Consequently, the arrangement would 
not cause opposition from the West or in the region. 
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3.1.2.a.  Currency Swap Agreements 
The early movement of Asian monetary cooperation is ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement in August 1977.  The maximum total outstanding amount of U.S. dollars 
provided by each participant was US$ 40 million.  This amount was miniscule to fend 
off the volatile capital reversal that occurred during the last Asian financial turmoil.  In 
principle, the amount of swap granted to a participant was to be provided in equal shares 
by the other participants.  However, a participant may refrain from swapping by 
informing the other member countries, and at its discretion, provide reasons for its 
decision.  In such cases, other participants are allowed to increase their shares on a 
voluntary basis.  In the case where the total amount of swap committed collectively by 
the participants does not sufficiently meet the requested amount, the amount of swap 
granted shall be reduced accordingly.32  The ASEAN Swap arrangement is a very 
primitive financing arrangement, compared to various well-organized European 
mechanisms.  The plan is that Asian nations will establish a pool to draw on the foreign-
exchange reserves of each other to defend their currencies in time of crisis.  Since the 
ASEAN pool is judged to be too small (US $200 million), the member nation roster must 
be expanded to include Japan, China and South Korea.33  When banks run into trouble, a 
government seeking to maintain an exchange rate peg will have limited ability to inject 
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credit into the banking system; since currency traders know that the authorities will find 
themselves between a rock and a hard place, banking problems inevitably spill over into 
the foreign exchange market. – Even countries with rigidity fixed exchange rate can, of 
course, give themselves some leeway to intervene on behalf of their banking systems.  
The swap arrangements are on of the source of policy flexibility.34 
 
3.1.2.b.  ASEAN Surveillance Process 
ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP, hereafter) also can be views as an alternative 
for AMF in taking the role of crisis prediction and monitoring.  For it is increasing 
consensus that macroeconomic indicators is not sufficient as crisis surveillance system.  
Since the crisis first affect neighbor economies those deeply interlinked, regional 
surveillance system may better serve than IMF.  ASP currently shares a principle of 
informal peer review, complementary global surveillance, and participation of all 
members.  ASP is not based on crisis models for crisis prediction; rather close 
monitoring of regional economy based on major economic indicators and financial 
indicators to predict the possibility of crisis. 
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3.2  Currency Bloc in Asia 
A more radical approach towards monetary cooperation than AMF or Swap is 
forming a currency bloc in Asia.  The AMF or Swap Arrangement is denominated in 
U.S. dollars, which implies that this financing mechanism has nothing to do with region-
wide exchange rate coordination.35  However, there is a growing recognition for the 
need to stabilize exchange rates among the regional currencies.  It is widely recognized 
that the devaluation of the Chinese Yuan in 1994 and the depreciation of the Japanese yen 
in 1996 played an important role in precipitating the Asian financial crisis. 
 
3.2.1 Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
The Scope and the speed of Asian crisis imply that the economies in the region 
are very closely connected.  In this context, studies focused on whether Asia satisfies the 
Optimum Currency Area to become like EU. 
Optimum Currency Area is, by definition, a group of regions with economies 
closely linked by trade in goods and services and by factor mobility, therefore, gives 
incentives to concert monetary policies.  This result follows from the finding that a fixed 
exchange rate area will best serve the economic interests of each of its members if the 
degree of output and factor trade among the included economies is high.36  Therefore, 
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growing economic inter-linkages in Asia came to question whether it could be a 
candidate for OCA, through which the region may establish more stable economy and 
expect to prevent or marginalize external shocks and liquidity problems.  In terms of 
OCA implications, East Asia has been proved to be a good candidate for the 
establishment of a currency area and policy coordination given the high degree of 
economic interdependence in the region considering OCA criteria.37 
 
3.2.1.a.  Degree of Intra-Regional Trade 
One of the characteristics of East Asia (including Japan) is its high share of intra-
regional trade, which was 45% in exports, and 49% in imports, 47% in total trade during 
1990-98; excluding Japan, corresponding figures were 37, 35 and 36%.  Figure 1. and 
Figure 2. Direction of Trade of East Asia (Appendix B. p. 70) by total amount and by 
share show that intra-regional trade in East Asia is increasing and reached a fairly high 
level.  Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (1999) stated that this degree of intra-regional 
trade in East Asia is similar to the euro area and that intra- regional trade as a share of 
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regional GDP is even higher than for the countries participating in MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA.38 
 
3.2.1.b.  Extent of Intra-regional Financial Flows 
For 14 countries of East Asia (excluding Japan), about 11 % of total FDI inflows 
during 1990-98 came from Japan, about 10% from the U.S. and about 9% from Europe.  
Over $40 billion, however, is accounted for by intra-regional sources, reflecting the fact 
that over 60% percent of the $540 billion inflows into China came from Hong Kong.  
The presence of FDI from the U.S. and Europe is much more significant in Korea, 
whereas Japanese FDI constitutes the largest segment in Taiwan.  Japan, the U.S. and 
the EU are equally important foreign direct investors in East Asia, with Japan being the 
most significant in ASEAN.39 (Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia by 
Source, Appendix B. p.71) 
 
3.2.2 Adverse Factors for Currency Bloc 
On one hand, it seems that Asian countries have achieved a high level of 
economic integration.  This high degree of integration and symmetry would indicate an 
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ideal environment for the implementation of a currency area.40  The economies of East 
Asia appear to be plausible candidates for internationally harmonized monetary policies 
on most of standard OCA grounds.   
Although the region meets OCA criteria no less than that of European Union, it 
does not necessarily have to be clear whether Asia can form OCA or not.  
 
3.2.2.a.  Trade Structures 
Trade structure of Asia is in fact not wholly integrated.  The impact of yen-
dollar exchange rate fluctuation on two groups of countries – East Asian NICs including 
Japan versus ASEAN countries – is asymmetric.  While the Trade structures of the East 
Asian NICs are competitive compared with that of Japan, the trade structures of the 
ASEAN countries and China are complementary to that of Japan.  Consequently, the 
impact of a fluctuating yen-dollar rate on these countries is asymmetric.41 
As a separate but related point, demand and supply shock in the region are not 
completely symmetric.  When considering which countries should form a currency 
union, most economists agree that one necessary condition for a currency union to make 
most sense is that the shocks hitting the system be symmetric rather than idiosyncratic.42  
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Bayoumi and Eichengreen studied the degree of symmetry and correlation of supply and 
demand shocks by means of structural VARs, and indicate that Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand have highly correlated demand shocks.  As regards to supply 
shocks, they find two groups of countries, namely Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.43  These asymmetries suggest that currency union in the region 
could entail substantial cost in terms of stabilization.   
 
3.2.2.b.  Problems of Financial Fragility in Emerging Markets  
This factor provides strong argument against schemes for a common currency 
peg, as they impact different countries at different times.44  Financial disturbances are an 
increasingly prevalent source of asymmetric shocks.  The argument is that Asia’s 
emerging economies need exchange rate flexibility and monetary independence to cope 
with financial disturbances.45   
Asia still has fragile financial system.  Domestic financial systems are less well 
developed than in Western Europe.  The legacy of financial repression and capital 
controls continues to limit financial depth (Dornbush and Park 1996).  Currency pegs, 
whether unilateral or collective, are risky where governments are required to intervene in 
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support of their banking systems.  Proponents of collective pegging may object that this 
freedom would not be sacrificed if the fluctuation of currencies were limited to, if the 
band was allowed to crawl, and if realignment were undertaken as appropriate.46 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi have made the conclusion that OCA in Asia would 
not be feasible for additional following reasons.  1. Common basket peg assumes nine 
governments of East Asia be in uniformity and reliance on consultation and 
institutionalization  2. Pegs are resilient to shocks only when they receive collective 
support  3. Governments are willing to commit significant financial resources to other 
countries’ currency pegs only when there exist institutional guarantees of leverage over 
those countries’ domestic policies. 4. Even if one decides on economic grounds in favor 
of a common basket peg, there remains the question of whether Asia possesses the will 
and political coordination skill to operate it successfully. 
 
3.2.3 Yen or Dollar Bloc 
The importance of yen is increasing in the region.  It is partly true that Asian 
economies should have taken a greater account on yen in their exchange rate system.  
However, its level is still far behind dollar.  The ratio of yen-based trade in Japanese 
trade is 40% for exports and 19% for imports.  These figures are excessively low 
                                                 
46 p.25, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996),"Is Asia Optimum Currency Area?" 
 38 
compared to the corresponding figures for the U.S. (dollar-based export ratio of 96% and 
an import ratio of 85%) and Germany (a Deutsch mark-based export ratio of 77% and an 
import ratio of 56%).  Although Japan’s net external assets of $748 billion are the 
largest in the world, they are exposed to foreign exchange risk because of the 
predominance of those based in dollars, the currency of the world’s largest debtor 
country.47 
Frankel and Wei (1993,1994) concluded that Asia is yet de facto dollar bloc since 
the importance of yen in regional economic transaction is still far behind that of dollar.  
However, the importance of yen is increasing since mid-1980s.  Talvas and Ozeki 
(1992) also concluded that ratio of yen-based transaction is increasing in both trade and 
capital movement.  As Tokyo became regional financial center from 1980s, Japan has 
been enthusiastic on the internationalization of yen currency.   
Although the importance of yen is increasing in intra-regional economic 
transaction, forming a yen bloc will take a long time first because it is still below the 
level of dollar's importance in the region, secondly because Asia will not welcome the 
idea for political and historical reasons. 
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3.3 Regional Exchange Rate Coordination48 
Other things being equal, greater exchange rate volatility impedes trade and FDI 
links, while exchange rate stability promotes trade and FDI links.  In the context of East 
Asia, this suggests that as more and more countries began to peg their currencies 
effectively to the US dollar, the dollar/yen exchange rate became more and more volatile, 
and East Asia's trade and FDI share of the U.S. rose at the expense of Japan, a 
phenomenon not inconsistent with the gradual decline of Japan actually observed in East 
Asian Trade over the recent decade.49  Therefore, exchange rate coordination in the 
Asian region has important implications for regional integration and stability. When 
considering regional exchange rate coordination in Asia, the discussion revolves around 
the issue of whether yen or dollar should play the role of the anchor currency. 
 
3.3.1 The Financial Role of Japan in the Regional Economy 
It has often been claimed by Japanese leaders that current exchange rate system 
in Asian countries does not put as much weight on yen as it should compared to dollars, 
therefore, it aggravated the impact of the Asian crisis.  Most East Asian currencies were 
pegged to the dollar, the dollar appreciation therefore reduced East Asian export 
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competitiveness in Japan and vis-à-vis Japanese competition in third markets.  While 
foreign direct investment and lending to East Asia were dominated by Japan, most 
foreign portfolio investments came from the United States and Europe.  Yet a large 
proportion of the funding of these portfolio investments came from Japan.  Investors 
borrowed at low interest rates in Japan, changed yen into dollar and re-invested those 
dollars throughout the world.  A large amount of the funds went to the East Asian high-
growth area.  Most East Asian countries (with exceptions such as China and Taiwan) 
undertook significant capital account liberalization to attract these funds from the early 
1990s. 
East Asian foreign debt soared as a result of the inflow of loans.  East Asian 
vulnerability came from two sides.  First, a large proportion of these loans were short-
term (one year maturity or less) which were used to finance long-term investment and 
renewed on a regular base.  Second, most of the loans were not hedged against exchange 
rate changes.  In Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, which eventually received 
"rescue packages" from the IMF, the amount of short-term debt exceeded foreign reserves.  
Their economic stability came to rely on the willingness of foreign lenders to renew 
short-term loans.  Furthermore, domestic bank lending was expanding at a fast pace and 
large portion of the lending was financed by offshore borrowing.  A foreign debt crisis 
would therefore have strong domestic repercussions.  
 41 
The declining yen from mid-1995 and the devaluation of the Mexican peso 
after the 1994/5 Mexican crisis reduced the export competitiveness of the region.  This 
may have reduced the investors’ confidence, especially in the case of Thailand, which 
had negative export growth in 1996. 
It is significant that the crisis was triggered in May 1997 when Japanese 
officials hinted at an increase of the Japanese discount rate.  The threat never 
materialized, but it induced global investors who had been capitalizing on the interest rate 
margins between the yen and regional currencies to sell Southeast Asian currencies.  
During May and June a number of major Thai financial institutions failed.  By 2 July the 
Bank of Thailand floated the baht.50 
As the Thai crisis evolved, foreign investors "discovered" that many countries in 
the region had huge amounts of outstanding debt and modest currency reserves.  Hedge 
funds speculated against regional currencies and stocks, while smaller "security seekers" 
fled the region.  Lenders refused to renew loans due.  Large-scale dumping of assets 
and currencies pushed down asset values and forced the central banks to let their 
currencies float.  A 1996 net inflow of private capital to South Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia of US$ 93.0 billion changed to a US$ 12.1 billion net outflow in 
1997.  The countries were caught in vicious circles of currency depreciation, increased 
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foreign debt and ensuing collapse of the domestic financial system.  They then had to go 
to the IMF to ask for emergency credits.  Stand-by agreements were signed by Thailand 
(5 August), Indonesia (31 October) and South Korea (4 December).51 
 
3.3.2 Exchange Rate Coordination in the Region 
Given the dominant financial role of the Japanese economy in the region and the 
experience of the Asian Financial Crisis that we just examined, the Japanese 
administration argues that economies in the region should take a greater account of yen in 
their exchange rate systems in order to minimize the impact of similar crisis.  However, 
importance of dollar is still exceeding that of yen in the regional economy as was 
mentioned previously.  Therefore, most of studies suggest the region to take common 
basket peg for exchange rate coordination to the US dollar.  According to the 
experiment of Williamson52 with common basket (consisting of the US dollar, the yen 
and the euro) for nine East Asian Economies (i.e. China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, 
Korea Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan POC, and Thailand), given the 
geographical distribution and industrial structure of trade that are broadly similar across 
countries, a common basket would have been far better for all countries than the actual 
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exchange rate policies yielded.  A common basket would give results of stabilizing the 
real effective exchange rates for almost all countries.   
 
3.4  Chapter Conclusion 
 
Asia as a region possesses enough economic resources to prevent and manage 
future crisis if the coordination is well organized.  AMF is economically feasible.  Asia 
is by any standard comparable to the European Economy.  Asia has achieved substantial 
level of economic inter-linkages and meets the OCA criteria.  Although diversities exist 
in the region, well-structured coordination will surely enhance the stability and 
development of the regional economies.  Despite economic feasibility of AMF and 
OCA, Asia does not seem to move towards that direction at the moment.  AMF proposal 
is virtually replaced by ASP and Swap Arrangements.  Although OCA seems plausible 
in Asia, forming a currency bloc was not formed in the region remains a remote 
possibility. 
Financial integration implies the establishment of a much deeper and more 
continuous relationship that somehow binds the agents or economies together and 
changes the way they operate.  However, this does not imply that Asia will form a 
regional bloc.  Despite economic benefits that can be achieved through various 
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coordinations, countries are hesitant to move forward for political reasons. 
That is why AMF did not receive enough supports, but countries rather seek for 
mechanisms that require low levels of political coordination.  In the next chapter, it is 
argued that interest of each country is too varied and divergent to generate sufficient 
political support for a substantial level of coordination on the monetary issues. 
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CHAPTER IV.  Political Aspects of the Asian Monetary Cooperation 
Economic feasibility does not imply political feasibility at the same time.  
Any form of monetary arrangement would require high political commitment.  Besides, 
it is abetted by the fact that the West let Asians down on key occasions – as when the 
United States opted out of the initial support package for Thailand, thereby weakening its 
credibility and enhancing the prospect of subsequent contagion.53   
Despite favorable initial responses toward regional monetary cooperation 
proposals, formation of a regional institution, say AMF, did not materialized.  In this 
chapter, I scrutinized the interests of different players focusing on AMF proceedings to 
conclude that it was not viable due to different motivation of each country.  By 
examining the AMF case, we may have better understanding on which way Asia will 
advance monetary cooperation.  
 
4.1   Intra-regional Factors 
 
4.1.1. Japan 
Japan was the country that most vigorously pursued country to thrust AMF.  
However, the primary objective of Japanese effort does not seem to be the AMF itself.  
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Rather it is driving for the internationalization of yen currency and Japanese endeavor to 
AMF and other monetary cooperation should be viewed along this line. 
Before the crisis, Japan invested vast amounts of capital and technology 
assistance to Asian countries making all effort to take a role of regional leader.  When 
the crisis hit Asian economy, Japan has been criticized for its reserved attitude.  
Although it has strong interest in the region as well as enough resource to curb the 
liquidity crisis at the initial phase, it did not step forward until the IMF, the U.S., and 
other economies reached consensus.  Besides, Asian countries, those who mostly 
adopted Japanese financial system and followed its practices, are now endeavoring 
restructure after the crisis to import western systems.   Therefore, AMF proposal can be 
interpreted as Japanese attempt to fortify its regional status for two channels; first by 
emphasizing the importance of financial cooperation between the counties within the 
region, it may be able to take leadership in coordination.  Second by reserving yen in the 
AMF, it will better serve to internationalize yen currency.   
However, AMF proposal was officially withdrawn partly due to the opposition 
from the U.S. and the IMF, and partly due to inconspicuous support from the countries in 
the region, save ASEAN.  Japan does not seem to continue to on AMF for the following 
reasons.  First, AMF proposal lost its raison d'être as the insufficiency problem of IMF 
resource, has been virtually resolved.  Second, Japan would not initiate any attempt that 
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may create difficulties in the traditional strategic alliance with the U.S.  Third, it will not 
explicitly attempt to take the leadership in near future given the circumstance in Asia and 
especially when its trustworthiness decreased in the region after the crisis, as was 
mentioned above.54   Fourth, AMF was not the final objective for Japan but the 
internationalization of yen.  It is because yen-dollar fluctuation will bring instability by 
inducing competitive devaluation in other East Asian countries. 
Not surprisingly, Japanese MOF has also terminated the discussion on the 
AMF.  Japan has shifted its focus on the materialization of regional aid programs 
through Miyazawa plan and other mechanism.  Japan seems to focus on other tasks in 
order to materialize yen’s internationalization instead of AMF proposal itself.  However, 
AMF will be continuously discussed for long-term since the internationalization of yen 
depends on whether yen can achieve a substantial level of importance in the region. 
 
4.1.2 China 
China will remain reserved in any kind of regional institution for monetary 
coordination. First, although China is not one of direct crisis-hit country, its economic 
burden has increased as the regional economy went under recession after the crisis.  
Second, China who seeks to take regional leadership, would not actively oppose to the 
                                                 
54 For the same reason, Japan was one of the founding member of APEC, yet remain reserved to take 
leadership role for countries in the region had highly restrain Japan from taking leadership role  
 48 
establishment of institutions for regional cooperation. Besides, China recognizes that 
regional economic surge is aligned with its national interest.  Third, China at the same 
time, cannot take leadership in the regional economy for neither its financial system is 
developed nor it can accelerate financial liberalization.  Fourth, China has yet to have 
power to influence countries in the region.  While it has an incentive to restrain the U.S. 
influence in the region through regional institution, China remains hesitant to any set of 
regional institution as long as Japan has greater chance to take a regional leadership.  Up 
until the crisis, Japan has been the most active investor in ASEAN economies.  
Nonetheless, the region has been turned to western financial system guided by IMF 
program; the influence of the U.S. or E.U. may naturally increase.  Therefore, China 
will seek to replace the role of Japan in the region while restraining the influence of the 
U.S. or E.U. by stepping on the side of ASEAN.55  It is also reported that Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji, when he visited Malaysia, has expressed supportive stance toward 
regional setting like EMF, where the ASEAN will be the center and not Japan.  However, 
EMF will require at least 20~50 billion dollars in order to work as a regional monetary 
fund.  It will be unrealistic if Japan is missing, or one can deny major role of Japan.  
Therefore, China will support the consensus of regional monetary cooperation yet be 
reserved to any specific proposals.  
                                                 
55 It is reported that Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, when he visited Malaysia, has expressed 
supportive stance toward regional setting like EMF, where the ASEAN will be the center and not Japan. 
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4.1.3 Republic of Korea 
Korea expressed enthusiastic interest when AMF was first proposed.  Korea 
recognized long-term benefit through AMF for regional economic stabilization.  
Nonetheless, the administration was unable to be engaged actively for several political 
reasons.  Korean economy is still dependent on the U.S.  The country, although 
drastically recovering from the crisis, is still under the IMF restructuring program.  Any 
direct conflict with the U.S. or the IMF will not be in national interest.  Accordingly, it 
emphasizes the role of AMF to be complementary to the IMF.  Besides, it recognizes the 
importance of regional cooperation on this matter and takes apprehensive stance of "not 
against AMF, not against West."  Besides, AMF proposal is virtually faded away at the 
moment and even if it is established, it will take quite a long time to see benefits from 
AMF.   
Given the situation, Korea does not seem to insist on the AMF.  It would 
rather strategically look for regional forum and open to regional discussion for financial 
cooperation that includes the East Asian Three (China, Japan and Korea) as long as it 
does not conflict with existing international financial architecture.  It welcomes full 
scope of utilization of reserves at central banks effectively for financial stability.  
Korea's strategy is to actively engage in regional forums to fully express standpoint of 
Korea and closely monitor other countries on the matter.  If there is to be a active 
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movement towards AMF, Korea will reconsider the issue.56 
 
4.1.4 ASEAN 
Among ASEAN countries, interests also vary.  Indonesia is not in a position 
to actively propose policies due to its domestic instability. ASEAN countries are 
beneficiary of Japanese economic support.  Therefore, it supports the idea of AMF 
predicting Japan to increase investments into Southeast Asian countries once AMF is 
established.  Among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are most 
likely to benefit from AMF-like settings.  However, Indonesia is not able to deeply 
involve in this matter due to domestic economic instability.  Thailand, Philippines and 
Indonesia are rather careful in approaching the AMF issue for they are the beneficiaries 
of IMF loan.  Malaysia, on the other hand, is critical to IMF programs.  Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir is enthusiastic on AMF proposal.  On the 18th of October 1999, 
he has proposed East Asian Monetary Fund (EMF, hereafter) at the World Economic 
Forum.  Rational is that EMF will limit the influence of Japan while the initial need for 
AMF would be carried out.  He stressed the importance of East Asian economy 
therefore EMF would be accurate instead of AMF.  One thing to note is that this 
proposal is coincide with the interest of China and Korea, therefore, maybe politically 
                                                 
56 MOF inside document 
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more plausible than AMF.  
 
4.2  Extra-regional factor 
 
4.2.1 United States  
The U.S. is one of the strongest contenders of the AMF proposal.  It has been 
skeptical on the regionalization of "Asia-Only".  Wade and Verneroso (1998) noted that, 
"the U.S. Treasury pulled out all the stops to kill the proposal (of AMF), and it died."57   
It was stated that the previous effort to establish an AMF in the middle of the 
Asian financial crisis was effectively thwarted by the US Treasury, which favored the 
exclusive control by the IMF over emergency funds to the region.  Again the US 
Treasury appears to be less than happy about the present discussion, yet the IMF’s new 
managing director Horst Koehler gave a cautiously sympathetic response to the proposal, 
sprinkled with reservations about moving too fast.58 
The U.S. government expressed reservation on the viability of the AMF for 
several reasons.  Firstly, there is a concern that AMF will be an unnecessary redundancy 
of the IMF.  If it were not to retain neutrality or differ its function from that of the IMF, 
it would only relegate the role of the IMF.  This would impede necessary policy 
                                                 
57 p. 19-21, Wade R. and Veneroso F. " The Resources Lie Within," The Economist, November 7, 1998  
58 Kristen Nordhaug, Asian Monetary Fund revival?, find at 
http://www.focusweb.org/focus/pd/apec/fot/fot51.htm#amf 
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implementation or reform programs, therefore, exposing countries to a greater risk of 
financial crisis.  Secondly, Asia lacks regional leadership to effectively organize 
regional institutions.59  For this reason, the U.S. views APEC as an alternative channel 
to respond the current need for monetary cooperation.  Being in opposition of sub-
grouping among Asian countries, it has also argued that AMF that excludes non-Asian 
members of APEC would not be beneficial to the regional economic development.  
Behind these reasoning, the U.S. appeared to be highly concerned about 
loosing its influence in Asia.  It is not an odd thing to see that the U.S. and the IMF 
often represent the interest of each other considering its memberships at the advisory 
board of the IMF.   However, the administration later on changed its position rather 
moderate partly supporting the proposal given one condition – membership extended to 
APEC member countries.   This is the idea drafted by Fred Bergsten, Director of 
Institution of International Economy (IIE) to elevate the AMF to the Asia Pacific 
Monetary Fund (APMF), which will comprise the membership of Asia and Pacific and 
also will complement the role of the IMF.  By proposing APMF, the U.S. is seeking a 
way to take leadership role if the regional monetary is to be formed, just as it did so in the 
process of APEC formation.  This evidence shows that the U.S. will not be in strong 
                                                 
59 Japan is probable candidate for the regional leadership considering its influence in the regional economy.  
However, it has politically limited and countries in the region, especially China and Korea, are acutely 
hesitant to regionalization if an initiation or leadership is to be undertaken by Japan.  For the same reason, 
APEC was sluggish until the U.S. took the initiation. AMF that excludes several members of APEC may 
not be beneficial to regional economic development.  
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opposition or maybe even supportive if the regionalization does not exclude them. 
  
4.2.2 IMF 
IMF is against any kind of set or institutions that may intervene its role and 
scope.  Its major concern is AMF may decrease or weaken the role of IMF.  It is very 
likely even if AMF is complement to IMF that Asian countries will depend on AMF if it 
faces another liquidity crisis.  IMF emphasizes that more important issue than just 
providing rescue fund to the crisis-hit countries is restructuring program.  Therefore, 
IMF expects financial supports to be made from current system.  In May 1999, Director 
of IMF, Michel Camdessus had urged Japan to focus on more pragmatic approach like 
Miyazawa initiatives.  There is also a view that the role of regional mechanism will 
continuously decrease as recent trend illustrate that the financial markets are more and 
more integrated into one global system. 
 
4.2.3 Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand is geographically in odd position.  It is neither in 
western hemisphere nor in Asia.  While most of economies in the world increasingly 
form a regional forum, these countries were not involved in any regional economic 
consortium.  As its trade volume with East Asia is increasing, it gives greater 
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importance on the relations with this region.  For that reason, they had been actively 
engaged in APEC proceedings and expected to continue supporting any economic 
arrangement in Asia as long as they can be involved. (expand) 
 
4.2.4 Europe 
Europe is prone to IMF-centered architecture.  It expects Japan to put more 
attention in Japanese domestic economic recovery and strengthening of financial systems 
rather than assisting Asian countries. 
 
 
4.3 Chapter Conclusion 
 
As long as the supply side of capital are not adequately addressed, the East 
Asian countries will remain as vulnerable to future crises as they were before.  Instead 
of waiting until the G-7 creates a new architecture, whose effectiveness is at best 
questionable, it would be the best interest of East Asians to work together to create their 
own self-defense arrangements.60  
Although many Western economists and policy makers have dismissed the 
                                                 
60 Park, Yung-Chul; Wang, Yunjung, "Reforming the International Financial System and Prospects for 
Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia," Mimeo, 2000 
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contention that a regional financing arrangement could be structured and managed to be 
complementary to the IMF, Asian countries rationale is that an Asian regional financing 
arrangement could provide additional resources to the IMF while joining forces to work 
on matters related to the prevention and management of financial crises.  Furthermore, 
joint effort of the East Asian countries to monitor economic and financial market 
developments in the region will support the IMF's global surveillance activities.  In this 
regard, an East Asian regional financing arrangement, along with a regional surveillance 
process, can be explored while avoiding institutional duplication and reducing 
operational costs.61   
However, different interest of countries in regards to the institutional settings 
projects that AMF-like institutionalization is not feasible in the near future.  The Region 
will rather seek for bilateral cooperation and currency swap agreements to avoid any 
direct confliction with each other as well as with international institutions. 
Bergsten's proposals seek to co-opt the vision of an AMF, draw all its teeth, 
and bring Asian finances to the aid of new hybrid IMF-APMF.  But it misses the core 
features of the AMF proposed here.  First, the AMF we envisage acts quite differently 
from the IMF.  It would have sufficient reserves to provide a credible threat to would-be 
speculators in Asian current markets, able to intervene without notice to correct markets 
                                                 
61 p.33, Regional Arrangement to Borrow, KIEP2000 
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and destroy speculative windfall gains, turning them into losses.  This, the IMF has 
never done and does not have the power to do.  Second, an AMF also carries a credible 
threat to intervene in other markets, including Asian stock and bond markets, to correct 
speculative upheavals.  This is what was done by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 
July 1998, to uproars of condemnation by the world's press.  Most importantly, the idea 
of an AMF represent a long-overdue expression of a capability for collective action on 
the part of Asian countries that have long been at loggerheads over ideological or 
historical issues.62 
                                                 
62 p.5-6, John A. Mathews; Linda Weiss, The Case for an Asian Monetary Fund, JPRI Working Paper 
No.55, March 1999 
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CHAPTER V.  CONCLUSION 
 
There are good economic reasons for monetary cooperation on regional 
interdependence grows.   The region has reached sufficient level of intra-regional trade 
and investment that is comparable to the level of European Union.  Besides, there is an 
argument that OCA criteria is endogenous, which means once a region is integrated, 
intra-regional economic activities and interdependency becomes more intensive therefore 
greater return of benefit.   
Despite these benefits, no formal economic cooperation arrangements has been 
established in Asia due to intra-regional political rivalries and hostilities as well as 
outside constraints and pressures.  It was shown throughout the history of Asian 
economic cooperation.  The organizational structures regional economic forums such as 
APEC partly project.  Many attempts were made but the regional cooperation until 1996 
was primitive and to be seen as networking process.  
Impetus for monetary cooperation comes from the shock of Asian financial 
crisis and the failures of the IMF in dealing with Asian crisis in 1997.  The outbreak of 
devastating region-wide crisis alerted countries in the region and made them a strong 
need for closer cooperation.  This collective effort would bring economic stability in the 
region and introduce a better mechanism for crisis management and prevention that can 
be tailored to the Asian need.   
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The crisis clearly gave a certain type of legitimacy for one country to care or 
even to intervene in the other economies in the region.  Nevertheless, this enthusiasm 
did not last long and the shock therapy of the crisis for monetary cooperation was 
temporary.  Despite the initial enthusiasm for AMF, divergence in political interests, 
which has been a crucial hindrance to formal regional economic arrangements, remained 
the greatest obstacle to further monetary cooperation and ended AMF proposal.   
Shortly after the demise of the idea of the AMF proposal, studies has focused 
whether the region can be benefited from economic integration or desirable form of 
economic cooperation as well as other alternative mechanism to bring regional economic 
stabilities.  Although the creation of currency bloc or intensive monetary arrangement 
would greatly benefit the region, it would still require a substantial political cost, the area 
that the region has not been disciplines or is willing to bear the cost. 
Although extra-regional oppositions and intra-regional scarcity of support for 
the AMF had demised the proposal, the regional administrations vigorously sought for 
alternative monetary arrangement mechanism for economic stabilization.  As long as the 
region has consensus to bring closer cooperation, it will continuously search for regional 
arrangement in a way or another that will be able to sufficiently project voices and 
interests of their own, but not to conflict with international regimes.  
Many studies and research introduced alternative proposals and cooperation 
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mechanisms.  Besides, there already exist regional monetary organizations, whose 
objectives and scope of activities do not differ so much from what an Asian Monetary 
Fund might do.  Two such organizations are the Arab Monetary Fund (Also AMF) and 
the Latin American Reserve Fund (LRAF).63 
Asia may be economically ready for formal economic integration.  However, 
any form of monetary cooperation requires extensive political commitment.  Given the 
circumstance of Asia, it is still premature to bring an extensive political coordination.  
While political maturity of Asian regionalization is still low, economic cooperation would 
not be able to fully follow the desires.  The AMF is simply an example that Asia is still 
a region of less-institutionalization.  For this reason, efforts for monetary cooperation 
move to a rather moderate form after the AMF proposal nullified. For instance, the region 
expanded already-exist bilateral monetary arrangement to multilateral ones. 
If the region would accomplish their need and desire for closer monetary 
coordinations, the process should be taken through a gradual phases on a long-term base.  
                                                 
63 P. 2-3, Chalongphob Sussangkarn, "East Asian Monetary Cooperation," Thailand Development Research 
Institute 
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APPENDIX I. CHRONOLOGY OF ASIAN MONETARY COORDINATION 
* This chronology is aimed to provide general trend of Asian Monetary Cooperation.  It focuses on regional forum, high-level meetings and 
meetings of central banks and their proceedings.  It also includes social landmarks, especially the spread of Asian crisis, to provide background 
information of regional gatherings.  
** Most of information is collected from daily news and government published announcements, especially Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, KOREA. However, this chronology is yet to be developed and also subject to change if more reliable 
source or information is found.  
 
Dates 
Major incident/ 
Launch 
Classification Member countries Major Concern / Achievement 
1950s  SEANZA 
Information 
Exchange among 
Central Banks 
South East Asia, New 
Zealand and Australia 
- Introduce training program for central bankers 
1966 Aug. SEACEN 
Information 
Exchange among 
Central Banks 
Southeast Asian Central 
Banks 
- The first institution designed to be monetary 
cooperation 
- Comprising ten central bank members with a research 
and training center in Kuala Lumpur 
1968  PBEC 
Economic 
cooperation among 
private entities 
The Pacific Basin 
Economic Council 
- Private Organization of Businessmen in the region 
1977  
ASEAN 
Swap 
Arrangement 
Currency Swap 
Agreement 
 
- The five original ASEAN countries, in pursuit of their 
common objective to promote monetary cooperation, 
established an ASEAN Swap Arrangement for a period 
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of one year 
1980  PECC 
Economic 
cooperation in 
general 
The Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council 
- Tripartite participation of government officials, 
businessmen, and academics. 
1989  APEC 
Economic 
cooperation in 
general 
Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation 
- To promote trade and investment amongst the 18 
member countries 
- Only ancillary discussions on monetary cooperation 
 
1991 Feb. EMEAP 
Exchange of 
Information 
Executives’ Meeting of 
East Asia and Pacific 
Central Banks 
- Asia Monetary cooperation took significant step 
forward  
- Proposed by Japan 
- 11 Member Countries: Japan, Korea, China, Austria, 
New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand  
- Concentration on the exchange of information 
1995 Nov 
Repurchase 
Agreement 
  
- Among Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Central 
banks of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand 
1996 
 
 
BIS admission of 
Asian central 
banks 
  
- People’s Bank of China, the Reserve Bank of India, 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore and Bank of Korea after Bank 
of Japan 
- Greater Asian monetary cooperation was advanced 
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Feb    
- Hong Kong and Singapore agreed to intervene for the 
account of the Bank of Japan to help the latter manage 
the dollar/yen rate 
 
Mar.    
- Bank of Japan joined the network of repurchase 
arrangements  
Jul 
Thailand Baht 
Crisis 
  - Request for IMF bailout 
Aug. 
Special Regional 
Fund proposal 
 
Meetings among countries 
that tries to rescue 
Thailand 
- Regional monetary fund was first proposed 
- Proposed by Malaysia Minister of Finance 
Sep.19 
ASIAN 
MONETARY 
FUND (AMF) 
proposal 
 
ASEM Financial 
Minister’s Meeting 
- Proposed by Japan and SE Asian countries 
1997 
Sep.21 
MIYAZAWA 
PLAN Draft 
 
IMF/IBRD Annual Meeting 
Deputies Meeting 
conducted by Japan 
 
- Participant; Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, 
Austria, Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei 
- Observer; U.S.A and IMF 
- Minister Misezka Hiroshi proposed to establish 
100 billion dollar Fund and expressed the will of 
the government of Japan to fund the half of the 
total amount 
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No conformity had been 
reached 
- IMF and U.S.A. opposed the idea for it may conflict 
with other international financial system; Aye from SE 
Asian countries; China postponed statement of their 
official status  
- Korea basically up to the idea under the assumption 
that AMF will provide foreign exchange flexibility 
- Japan and SE Asian countries continues discussion on 
the creation of the Fund reasoning that IMF quota of 
those countries are not sufficient to manage crisis 
considering its economic size. 
Oct. 
Indonesia 
Currency Crisis 
  - Request for IMF bailout 1997 
Nov. 
Korea Currency 
Crisis 
  
- Request for IMF bailout 
- Meeting of Financial Deputy Ministers 
- Japanese Economy was rocked by the failure of 
several financial institutions 
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Nov.18 
MANILA 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Invitation of ASEAN, 
14 countries deputies and 
Central bankers, IMF, 
IBRD, ADB hold a 
meeting 
- Asian financial market stabilization and prevention of 
further crisis 
- New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) had accorded 
expanding IMF assistant.  
- Agreed on the establishment of regional monitoring 
system (Monitoring twice a year) 
- Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF): IMF short-term 
Massive Fund injection as the second back-up facility  
- Idea of AMF creation was rejected 
 
?    
- Agreement of BOK to provide Thailand $0.2 billion 
of currency swap 
1998 Apr. 
ASEAN 
Surveillance 
Process (ASP) 
ADB meeting  
- Starting from October 1998, ASP is to be initiated to 
strengthen monitoring and cooperation among ASEAN  
Jul. EMEAP 
Executive Meeting 
of East Asia 
Pacific Central 
Bankers 
 
- Agreement among 11 central bankers in Asia to 
borrow emergency Yen with the exchange of national 
collateral from Japanese Central bank   
1998. 
Jul. 
New Minister 
Miyazawa’s 
Proposal on Fund 
to prevent 
speculative attack 
 
Proposal for 
Currency Defense Fund 
- CDF is similar to AMF 
- CDF is to be utilized only for defensive purpose in 
order to avoid redundancy with IMF 
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Aug. Russia in Crisis    
Sep. 
Malaysia in 
danger 
  - Malaysia initiates tight control on capital outflow 
Oct.4 
ASEAN Ministers 
of Finance 
Meeting 
 
ASEAN Surveillance 
Process 
- Inter-ASEAN economic policy cooperation and 
monitoring 
- Exchange of peer-pressure and information share 
- Technical support from ADB 
Oct. 
NEW 
MIYAZAWA 
PLAN 
 
Japanese Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa's idea presented 
at the 
G7 Meeting Special 
Communiqué 
- Countries will actively response future crisis  
- Promise to aid countries in financial crisis or 
equivalent danger with financial support of 30.6 billion  
- Half is to be provided for trade financing and short-
term aid and the other half is for mid and long-term 
purpose 
Oct. 
Korea-Japan 
summit Talk 
 
“Korea-Japan New 
Partnership toward the 21st 
century” 
 
Nov. APEC   Asia Growth and Recovery Initiatives (AGRI) 
 
Nov.12 
Korea-China 
Summit Talk 
 Beijing, China  
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1998 Mar.23 
Proposal for Asian 
Currency Crisis 
Support Facility 
  
- Japanese administration proposed Asian Currency 
Crisis Support Facility to facilitate liquidity in the time 
of crisis; 7.5 billion yen for interest rate coordination 
and technical support, 360 billion yen for rescue 
package. 
 May. 15 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Plan for Asia 
  
- Second phase of New Miyazawa Plan 
- This is primarily designed to reinvigorate Market 
function by pooling private funds 
Nov.16 
Asian Currency 
Crisis Support 
Facility 
(ACCSF) 
 
Joint Procurement of 
President Clinton of the 
U.S. and Prime Minister 
Obuchi of Japan on 
Asian Currency Support 
Facility (ACSF) 
- ACSF is one way to proceed Asian Growth and 
Recovery Initiative (AGRI) 
- The Support Facility is officially recognized by ADB 
called Asian Currency Support Facility with the amount 
of 3.6 billion dollars 
Nov.28 
Korea-Japan High 
level Meeting 
  
- Discussion for financial cooperation to establish crisis 
prevent mechanism  
1998 
Dec.4 
The 6th Korea-
China Financial 
meeting for 
Working level 
 Beijing, China 
- Bilateral cooperation on financial restructure and 
inter-financial institutions research and cooperation  
1999 Jan 
Brazil Currency 
Crisis 
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1999 Jan. 15 
Currency 
Swap: Korea-
Japan 
 ASEM Frankfurt, Germany 
- Japan-Korea agreement of Currency Swap in case of 
future crisis 
- Japan agreed to provide up to 5 billion dollars as a 
part of Miyazawa Plan  
- This fund will be given with below 7% interest rate 
1999 Feb 
Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) 
G-7 meeting  
- Members of major economies and international 
institutions  
- Reports on the impact of hedge fund, Short-term 
capital flows, and use of off-shore financial centers 
1999 Mar.20 
Korea-Japan 
Summit Talk 
 
“Korea-Japan Economic 
Agenda 21” 
- Enhance networking between central bankers 
- Increase economic cooperation among the member 
countries 
- Negotiation began on the investment arrangement and 
Korea-Japan Government-business cooperation for 
investment promotion and research projects 
1999 Mar ACCSF  ADB approval 
- ADB approval of $3.06 billion. Asian Currency Crisis 
Support Facility 
1999 Mar.20    
- Protocol on short term Swap agreement Singed by 
JEXIM and KIB 
1999 May.15 
New Miyazawa 
Initiative 
APEC  
- Package would be mobilized in mid and long-term 
requirement 
- The 2 trillion yen package ($16-7 billion.) would be 
used principally to help guarantee sovereign bonds 
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issued by Asian governments starting Oct. 1, 1999 
1999 Jun.25 
The 7th Korea-
China Financial 
meeting for 
Working level 
 Seoul, Korea 
- Y2K in financial network 
- MOU of future financial cooperation meetings 
1999 Aug. 
Seminar on NEA 
financial 
cooperation 
 China-Korea-Japan 
- Trilateral Talks on North East Asia financial 
cooperation system operation 
1999 Sep. G-20   
- Extended forum of G-7 to discuss international 
financial stability 
- 20 membership includes Newly Industrialized 
Economies 
 Sep 
Currency Swap: 
Japan-Malaysia 
  - 2.5 billion dollars 
1999 Sep. 
OBUCHI PLAN 
(Fund) 
 ASEAN+3 
- Obuchi plan to unveiled $500 million people-focused 
package aimed at boosting human resource 
development in East Asia  
1999 Sep.11 
APEC Korea-
China summit talk 
 Oakland, New Zealand  
1999 Oct.1 
Korea-Japan 
discussion on 
financial 
  - Japan initiate Korea-Japan investment arrangement 
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cooperation 
1999 Oct 
Japan Bank for 
International 
Cooperation 
(JBIM) 
Asian Currency 
Crisis Support 
Fund (ACCSF) 
creation 
   
1999 Oct. 23 
Korea-Japan 
Financial Meeting 
  
- Policy coordination of financial market in Korea and 
Japan 
- Promotion of financial market 
1999 Nov. 
Monitoring Board 
of Exchange Rate 
System  
  
- <Asian Economy, Special meeting for regional 
financial recovery> launched 
1999 Nov. 
ASEAN High 
level meeting 
  - AMF proposal reconsidered 
1999 Nov.28 ASEAN+3  Korea-Japan Summit Talk 
- Trilateral economic cooperation: Japanese Capital and 
Korean technology working with China 
1999 Dec.27 
The first Korea-
China Ministers 
meeting 
 Beijing, China 
- Discussion on economic cooperation and opening 
Chinese market to Korean investors and business 
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2000 Jan 
IMF Reform 
proposal 
G7 Meeting Tokyo, Japan - Agreement on the IMF reform 
2000 Feb.24~26 
The 2nd Seminar 
on financial 
cooperation of 
Korea-China-
Japan 
 Batfu, Japan  
2000 Mar.24  
ASEAN+3, 
Financial Ministers 
and Central 
Bankers' Meeting 
Brunei 
- AMF and Asian Single Currency Discussion 
- Expansion of Swap from $2 billion to $10 billion 
- Korea-China-Japan Swap agreement discussion 
2000 May.6 
CHIANGMAI 
INITIATIVE 
 
ASEAN+3, Financial 
Ministers Meeting 
- Agreement on Currency Swap extended to 13 regional 
countries 
- Bilateral Swap Arragement; BSA/ Repo network 
2000 Sep.20 
IMF Annual 
Meeting 
 Chezch, Prague 
- H. Koehler said at the press conference that the IMF 
does not oppose to the AMF proposal for it is mere 
regional monetary cooperation. 
2000 Nov.7 
ASEAN+3, 
Financial meeting 
 Beijing 
- Specific Chiangmai Initiative Mechanism  
- ASA and BSA basic framework, Swap/Repo 
principles 
2000 Nov.24 ASEAN+3  Singapore 
- Progress report 
- Currency Swap agreement previously among 
Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
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Indonesia now extended to Myanmar, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos and Brunei 
- Conditional CB swap agreement  
- Korea, Japan, China will independently proceed 
Currency Swap agreement with ASEAN countries 
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Figure 1. Figure 2. Direction of Trade of East Asia (Source: International Monetary Fund) 
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Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia by Source (Source: Asia Development Bank, 1997) 
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Table 1. Foreign Reserves in Asia (US $ million) 
 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Japan 88,720 115,146 172,443 207,335 207,866 203,215 
China 21,199 51,620 73,579 105,029 139,890 144,959 
Taiwan 83,575 92,457 90,311 88,040 83,505 90,339 
Hong Kong 42,986 49,251 55,398 63,808 92,804 89,601 
Korea 19,704 25,032 31,928 33,237 19,710 51,963 
Thailand 24,078 28,884 35,463 37,192 25,697 28,434 
Malaysia 26,814 24,888 22,945 26,156 20,013 24,728 
Indonesia 10,988 11,820 13,306 17,820 16,087 22,401 
Philippines 4,545 5,866 6,235 9,902 7,147 9,101 
Singapore 48,066 58,177 68,695 76,847 71,289 74,928 
Total 372,668 465,135 572,298 667,362 686,005 741,667 
Germany 72,727 72,219 77,794 75,803 69,853 64,133 
France 20,008 23,520 23,142 23,120 27,097 38,753 
Switzerland 31,650 33,554 34,685 36,775 36,899 38,346 
Gt. Britain 34,630 38,530 39,180 37,120 28,880 27,360 
Italy 25,140 30,107 32,942 44,064 53,431 25,447 
Canada 10,471 10,219 12,629 18,028 15,122 19,911 
Total 194,626 208,149 220,372 234,910 231,282 213,950 
(Source: International Financial Statistics, 1999) 
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